-Secretary of Defense William Cohen, news
briefing, March 24, 1999

Dealing with the breakup of Yugoslavia turned out to be the major test of NATO after the Cold War. It was also the biggest challenge for aerospace power since the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

Background to the Crisis

The fighting in Kosovo had been going on for a year when NATO began its air campaign in March 1999. To understand the broad reasons for the fighting, and for why NATO acted as it did, it is necessary to recall the early 1970s, when Josip Broz Tito still ruled a unified Yugoslavia.

Tito forged his control over Yugoslavia with a unique brand of communism that overrode the ethnic and political divisions that had dominated the region before Tito consolidated his power. He was known for tough crackdowns on dissenters, but, as he aged, he sought to give the ethnic minorities of Yugoslavia a greater voice. In 1974, Tito amended the Yugoslav constitution and granted autonomous status to Vojvodina and Kosovo as provinces. Kosovo was not a republic in the Yugoslav federation, like Serbia or Croatia, but it was recognized as a province within the sovereign structure. However, Tito was not able to make Yugoslavia's economy prosper. He died in 1980 and during the next decade, the economy of Yugoslavia plunged into crisis. The intricate political mechanisms that Tito left behind began to collapse.

Kosovo was one of the poorest regions of Yugoslavia. Soaring birthrates doubled the ethnic Albanian population between 1961 and 1981. The Serb population, which made up about 13% of the residents of Kosovo, grew increasingly alienated from the ethnic Albanian majority. A riot at Pristina University in 1981 was repressed by force and Yugoslav army troops killed 12 and injured 150 demonstrators. In April 1987, the head of the Serbian Communist Party, Slobodan Milosevic, traveled to Kosovo to hear the grievances of Serb residents. Milosevic delivered a television speech declaring to the Serbs, "You will never be beaten again." The speech inflamed Serb nationalism and marked the beginning of his assault on what remained of Tito's Yugoslavia.

In November 1988, Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leadership was replaced. A general strike escalated in February 1989. Then on March 23, 1989, Yugoslav tanks ringed the Kosovo assembly building and forced the legislators to vote to revoke the province's autonomous status. 1

Milosevic kept a sizeable army and police presence in Kosovo and ethnic Serbs held key government jobs. Ethnic Albanians established a parallel system of businesses, clinics, schools and universities. The pacifist Ibrahim Rugova initially emerged as informal leader of the ethnic Albanians. However, by the mid-1990s, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), built around a core of clan loyalties and former student dissidents, began to gain strength.

The end of war in Bosnia in late 1995 found the situation in Kosovo deteriorating. Unemployment among ethnic Albanians hovered near 70%. A number of ethnic Albanians who had joined the Muslim-Croat federation in its fight against the Bosnia Serbs during the Bosnian civil war returned to strengthen the KLA. The European Union formally recognized Milosevic's Yugoslavia. For Kosovo, this meant de facto international confirmation of Milosevic's authority over the province.

The Kosovo Liberation Army stepped up its struggle against Serb rule in early 1998. In late February, Serb forces wiped out leaders of the Jashari clan, a central element of the KLA. More than 50 people were killed. KLA forces retaliated with an ambush of a Yugoslav army convoy near Smolice on March 22, 1998. In response, Milosevic began a counterinsurgency campaign to drive ethnic Albanians from villages and towns bordering Serbia. 2

By June 1998, paramilitary special police (the MUP) and regular Yugoslav army units (the VJ) were heavily engaged in fighting around key Kosovo Albanian towns. Several towns had been destroyed and as many as 300 people had died. Some 20,000 refugees had already taken flight. Yugoslav forces made the roads from Kosovo to neighboring Albania a free-fire zone in an effort to close off supply lines to the Kosovo rebels.

This time, the US and NATO allies got involved early. US special envoy Richard Holbrooke started intensive negotiations with Milosevic in May 1998. In early June, US State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin called the situation in Kosovo a threat to the security of Europe. "When you see a determined effort to focus a military campaign against one ethnic group, to move people out of villages, to use heavy firepower-that is ethnic cleansing in my book," Rubin added. 3

 

The Theater of Operations

Kosovo is part of southern Yugoslavia. Tito gave the province autonomous status in 1974, but Milosevic revoked it in 1989. Nearly 90% of Kosovo's population of 2 million is of ethnic Albanian origin. In June 1998, US State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin called instability in Kosovo a threat to the security of Europe.

Through the summer and fall of 1998, the violence continued. American diplomats in Belgrade reported that the United Nations and several non-government organizations had estimated that Milosevic's forces had destroyed up to 30,000 homes since the summer. Estimates of "Internally Displaced Persons" (IDPs) ran as high as 300,000. As many as 100,000 were thought to be living in the open or residing in livestock barns or abandoned buildings unfit for human habitation. 4

October 1998 was a month of frenzied diplomatic activity. In late September, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, demanding that hostilities in Kosovo cease and warning that "additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability" could be taken. Holbrooke spent the first half of the month in Belgrade negotiating with Milosevic. As former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman observed, "Bosnia was an adventure for Milosevic and the world recognized its independence." On the other hand, "it's much harder for Milosevic to make concessions in Kosovo, which is recognized as part of Yugoslavia." 5 NATO set Oct. 27, 1998, as a deadline for Milosevic to comply with cease-fire terms. US Army Gen. Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, twice went to Belgrade to urge compliance. Then on Oct. 27, hours before the deadline, Milosevic pulled 4,000 special police troops out of Pristina. In November the international Kosovo Verification Mission started operations.

 

The war in Kosovo was the fourth instigated by Milosevic as the republics of Yugoslavia broke apart. Yugoslav forces fought Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 and assisted the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian civil war from 1992­95. This picture shows artillery damage to Sarajevo. Opponents like the Bosnian Muslims, and later, the Kosovo Albanians, were usually outmatched by heavy artillery and tanks under Serb control. Peace came to Bosnia only after NATO's two-week Operation Deliberate Force air campaign of 1995. (DoD photo by Lt. Stacey Wyzykoski)

Planning for A Military Response

Long before the Kosovo crisis peaked in March 1999, Clark had been planning for possible NATO airstrikes. Yet as violence continued in Kosovo, the military planning was caught in a dilemma. NATO was most likely to agree to short, sharp strikes to demonstrate resolve and push along the diplomacy. However, Milosevic's troops held the advantage on the ground in Kosovo. Any attempt to stop the Serbs from pushing out the ethnic Albanians might have to go through Milosevic's military force in Kosovo.

The disconnect grew out of the complicated relationship between force and diplomacy in NATO's response to Kosovo. Experience with Milosevic in Bosnia underlined that NATO might well have to be prepared to use military force to get Milosevic to comply with a peace settlement. In Bosnia, the air campaign had been indispensable, and Holbrooke, for one, thought it could work again. In an August 1998 interview, Holbrooke was asked whether he thought airpower would work against Milosevic in Kosovo. He quickly replied: "Of course. Doesn't everyone?" 6

At the same time, experience in Bosnia ruled out many options. The extensive commitment of ground forces as part of a UN protection force had not stopped the Bosnian Serbs from overrunning the UN-designated "safe area" of Srebrenica and massacring upwards of 7,000 civilians in the summer of 1995. In Kosovo, the situation could be worse. As Yugoslav forces pounded western Kosovo with mortar and artillery fire in June 1998, British officials said that London wanted Western governments "to consider a direct threat of air strikes against Serbia to force a settlement in Kosovo rather than getting bogged down in lengthy border deployments." 7 The position reflected apprehensions throughout the alliance.

 

Order of Battle in Kosovo, Late June 1998
Milosevic had garrisoned Yugoslav army and paramilitary police forces in Kosovo for a decade. The map shows that in June 1998, paramilitary and regular Yugoslav army units were heavily engaged in fighting the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) around key Kosovo Albanian towns. Several towns had been destroyed and as many as 300 people had died. Around 20,000 refugees had already taken flight. Well before Operation Allied Force began, Milosevic's forces held the tactical military initiative in Kosovo.
Milosevic's estimated strength in Kosovo Army (VJ) 12,000-13,000 troops 194 armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles 197 Tanks 266 mortars/ artillery pieces (larger than 100 millimeter) Police (MUP) 10,000 troops 60-70 armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles 110 mortars (82 mm)

Air planners began searching for appropriate targets for a Kosovo campaign. Throughout the summer of 1998, SACEUR Clark oversaw development of as many as 40 different versions of contingency airstrike plans. NATO aircraft flew a massive demonstration flight over Macedonia to remind Milosevic of NATO's resolve.

Two different air options were widely briefed to officials in Washington in the fall of 1998. In one option, NATO forces would carry out a limited air operation against fixed military targets. Reportedly, the plans for the limited air response envisioned that Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missiles (CALCMs) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) would be used on the first night. NATO aircraft would strike fixed military targets such as headquarters, communications relays, and ammunition dumps. Targets like these had dominated the target set for Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia three years earlier.

NATO also had another option referred to as a phased air operation with two missions. First, phased air operations could support international efforts to stop the violence in Kosovo and create the conditions for negotiations. Second, air operations could try to halt or disrupt the capacity of Serbia to inflict violent repression against Kosovo. The Kosovo campaign would unfold in multiple phases, beginning with a no-fly zone and attainment of air superiority over Kosovo itself. Then NATO air could attack Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo and extend the campaign to military targets throughout Yugoslavia. The phases were key to the flexibility of the plan. If Milosevic pulled back forces and complied with serious negotiations, the campaign could stop. On the other hand, if Milosevic remained defiant, the campaign would go on to target the capacity of his forces to continue their violence in Kosovo.

The broad outline of air operations seemed to span all possible options. The purpose would be to put an end to excessive police and military operations and bring about a negotiated cease-fire. In theory, NATO could show resolve with a short, sharp air operation or move to a phased, graduated campaign that could be regulated in intensity.

But there was a weak spot. Airmen could strike a batch of key targets quickly, but the plan to go after Yugoslav military forces would take much more effort and political resolve. By October 1998, in pure military terms, NATO's options were very constrained. If limited strikes did not work, it would take a sustained air campaign with 24-hour operations to halt or disrupt the Yugoslav army forces in Kosovo. Having an impact on special police units working in small groups would be extremely difficult. The more Milosevic pressed his tactical advantages with military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo, the harder it would be for NATO airpower to achieve fast results-unless just a show of force would do the job.

With hindsight, it is easy to see that by the fall of 1998, NATO military planning was drifting away from the reality on the ground in Kosovo. If NATO started a limited air operation, Milosevic would still have time to use his military forces to step up the violence. The limited air response was tailored only to be a diplomatic show of force, and the phased air campaign plans left Milosevic a gaping opportunity to seize the initiative before NATO built up its forces and political resolve to conduct a sustained air operation.

Why did the disconnect occur? Clark told reporter Michael Ignatieff that the NATO politicians "were never happy with a phased air operation, because they wanted something more limited, more diplomatique." 8 Given the lessons of Bosnia, it may have seemed that Milosevic would acquiesce once NATO stood united against him. NATO did cross a threshold on Jan. 30, 1999, by authorizing Secretary General Javier Solana to order airstrikes when necessary. Still, NATO seemed to be thinking about just a few days of strikes on fixed targets while Milosevic was getting ready to order the Yugoslav army to sweep through Kosovo. At any rate, the political will and the military strategy for a sustained air campaign never quite came together. The plans left a gap between the start of airstrikes and the point at which pressure from the air would isolate and pin down Milosevic's forces.

 

By March 1999, the UN estimated there were 240,000 ethnic Albanian Internally Displaced Persons in Kosovo. Within weeks, the number of refugees swelled to 600,000 as families fled Milosevic's forces. These Kosovo boys were residents of Camp Hope, an American-run refugee camp in Albania. (USAF photo by SSgt. Angela Stafford)

Rambouillet

Peace in Kosovo was only sporadic after the October 1998 cease-fire. Paramilitary forces killed 45 ethnic Albanians in Racak in mid-January. The slaying set in motion a diplomatic chain of events that led the six-nation contact group to give both Serbs and ethnic Albanian representatives an ultimatum to meet for talks at Rambouillet, France, in early February.

From Feb. 6 to Feb. 23, the two sides met at Rambouillet under the auspices of the US, the European Union, and the Russian Federation. The two sides adjourned and when the talks resumed, this time in Paris, on March 15, the ethnic Albanian delegation signed the agreement. However, Milosevic and the Serbs ultimately would not agree to the provisions of Rambouillet, specifically, the presence of NATO ground forces to ensure compliance. By March 18, 1999, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees estimated that there were 240,000 displaced persons--internal refugees--within Kosovo, accounting for more than 10% of the population. 9 Roughly one-third of the Yugoslav army's forces now massed on the border of Kosovo. Estimates placed the numbers at around 40,000 Yugoslav army (VJ) troops and about 300 tanks.

Holbrooke had said months earlier that the West had learned lessons from Bosnia. It remained to be seen what, if anything, Milosevic had learned. 10

1 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 94, 100.
2 Chris Hedges, "Future looks Grim for Kosovo Rebels," New York Times, June 9, 1998.
3 Robert A. Rankin and Richard Parker, "US May Use Troops or Jets To Aid Kosovo," Philadelphia Inquirer, June 9, 1998.
4 American Embassy, Belgrade, Cable, Oct. 21, 1998.
5 Steven Erlanger, "Has the West Learned From Mistakes in Bosnia?" New York Times, June 10, 1998.
6 Interview on Operation Deliberate Force with Rebecca Grant, USAF Television Studio, Aug. 5, 1998.
7 Reuters News Service, June 9, 1998.
8 US Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, quoted by Michael Ignatieff, "The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War," The New Yorker, Aug. 2, 1999.
9 Figure cited in R. Jeffrey Smith's, "Belgrade Rebuffs Final US Warning," Washington Post, March 23, 1999.
10 Steven Erlanger, "Has the West Learned from Mistakes in Bosnia?" New York Times, June 10, 1998.