Around May 22, the pressure increased again. Better
weather and more forces allowed NATO airmen to ramp up
the pressure on the Yugoslav army. In about ten days,
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) confirmed that NATO airmen
had doubled the number of tanks destroyed, hit three
times the number of armored personnel carriers, and hit
four times as many artillery and mortar pieces.
"We're driving him to a decision," announced
Clark at the end of May.
Also in late May the KLA began its first large-scale
offensive in more than a year. About 4,000 troops
pressed ahead from points along the Albanian border. The
KLA's "Operation Arrow" soon met heavy
resistance from Yugoslav artillery and troops. In about
two days, the rebels were pinned down along Mount
Pastrik. Heavy mortar and artillery fire ensued and the
KLA was "creamed" according to a senior US
intelligence official.
50
The small-scale offensive reportedly helped NATO
identify more Yugoslav military equipment in the
immediate area. "As the Serbs fire their artillery,
they're detected, said Wald. "Then we go ahead and
attack them and destroy them" with air.
51
US Defense Secretary Cohen emphasized that NATO was not
coordinating operations with the KLA. Indeed, by this
time, NATO air attacks on Yugoslav military
installations and forces were spread widely across
Kosovo and southern Serbia every day and night, well
beyond the localized effects of the KLA actions.
By early June, military impact and a series of
diplomatic events were coming together as powerful
coercion. The diplomatic chain of events had started a
few weeks earlier, with the G-8 meeting in Bonn on May
6. There, the major Western economic powers plus Russia
agreed on a basic strategy to resolve the conflict. An
international tribunal in The Hague on May 27 indicted
Milosevic as a war criminal--an indictment, as Cohen
pointed out, with no statute of limitations. Also, the
European Union announced its appointment of President of
Finland Martti Ahtisaari as its special envoy for Kosovo
on May 17. Under Ahtisaari's auspices, the US, NATO, and
Russia agreed to a NATO-drafted plan in late May.
Yugoslavia's parliament voted to accept the plan on June
3.
The air campaign was also having a devastating
effect. Roads, rail lines, and bridges across Yugoslavia
had been knocked out, halting the normal flow of the
civilian economy. Good weather and long summer days
ahead meant that more of Milosevic's country and his
military forces would be exposed to devastation. In late
May and early June, the impact on fielded forces spiked.
Destruction of armored personnel carriers, artillery,
and tanks continued to rise "almost
exponentially" in the words of JCS Chairman
Shelton. He said
the Yugoslav army forces lost 450 or about 50% of their
artillery pieces and mortars to air attack. About
one-third of their armored vehicles were hit: a total of
about 122 tanks and 220 armored personnel carriers. (A
later NATO assessment releases Sept. 16 put the numbers
at 389, 93, and 153 respectively.) These heavy losses
meant they could not effectively continue organized
offensive operations.
The Cumulative Toll on Serb Mobile Targets
US Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed the immediate
count of the results of the campaign on June 10.
Better weather and more forces exponentially
increased the hits on tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and heavy artillery. "I do not
believe that Milosevic ever understood the level
of damage that an expertly executed air campaign
could achieve," Shelton said. Numbers
subsequently confirmed by NATO on Sept. 16,
1999, were 93 tanks, 153 armored personnel
carriers, and 389 artillery and mortars.
|
At the same time, Yugoslav forces in Serbia were also
feeling the pressure. First army, in the north, had 35%
of its facilities destroyed or damaged while 2nd army,
near the Kosovo border, had 20% of its facilities hit.
Third army, assigned to operations in Kosovo, had 60% of
its fixed facilities damaged or destroyed. The Joint
Staff assessed that the air attacks had
"significantly reduced 3rd army's ability to
sustain operations.
Belgrade was largely without electric power and about
30% of the military and civilian radio relay networks
were damaged. Across Yugoslavia, rail and road capacity
was interdicted. Some 70% of road and 50% of rail
bridges across the Danube were down. Critical industries
were also hard hit, with petroleum refining facilities
100% destroyed, explosive production capacity 50%
destroyed or damaged, ammunitions production 65%
destroyed or damaged, and aviation and armored vehicle
repair at 70% and 40% destroyed or damaged,
respectively.
Industrial targets and bridges would take a long time
to repair. In many cases, electric power and
communications could be restored more readily. However,
the combined effect had brought the war home to
Belgrade, and restricted Milosevic's ability to employ
his fielded forces effectively. On June 9, after
last-minute wrangling with Yugoslav military commanders,
Milosevic accepted the NATO conditions.
|
Targeting Command, Control, and
Communications
Paralyzing communications was a top
priority. This chart details areas where air
attacks knocked out and degraded radio and TV
coverage. About 45% of the TV broadcast
capability was degraded and a third of the
military and civilian radio relay networks were
damaged.
|
|
Disruptions to Electric Power
When airmen got permission to attack targets
in Belgrade and across Yugoslavia, electric
power became a major target. The chart shows
that Belgrade had only limited power with
frequent disruptions. More disruptions occurred
across the country. Toward the end of the 78-day
bombing campaign, Milosevic "hadn't had
power in his capital for a number of days and
wasn't going to have it for a number of days
more," said USAF Lt. Gen. Michael Short,
Joint Force Air Component Commander.
|
What exactly had the air campaign achieved? As
Shelton briefed on June 10, "The strategy that NATO
adopted, which was a phased air campaign, increasing the
frequency and the intensity of our air operations and
our airstrikes to reduce the Serb forces'
capabilities--was successful."
52
"I think it was the total weight of our effort
that finally got to him," said Short, the allied
air commander. The 78-day air campaign brought about an
ending that seemed almost impossible back in March.
Milosevic agreed to a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Serb
forces from Kosovo, the entry of an international
peacekeeping force, the return of refugees, and Kosovar
autonomy within Yugoslavia. Kosovo would remain within
the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. However, the
international peacekeeping force would be armed and
empowered.
Military historian John Keegan wrote with some awe,
"Now, there is a new date to fix on the calendar:
June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President
Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower
alone."
53
Targets struck and effects imposed were important
ingredients, but the overall impact registered as
diplomatic success. On June 10, Secretary Cohen said,
"When I announced the first NATO airstrikes against
Yugoslavia, I stated a clear military goal: to degrade
and diminish the Serb military. Over the past 11 weeks,
NATO pursued that goal with patience, with persistence,
and with great precision. As a result, Serb forces are
leaving Kosovo, and NATO troops are poised to ensure
peace and stability in Kosovo so that more than one
million refugees and displaced persons can begin to
return to safety and start rebuilding their lives."
54
Second-guessing
Almost as soon as the Yugoslav forces started pulling
out of Kosovo, they also sought to minimize the impact
of the air campaign. A London Sunday Times article of
June 20, cited Serb sources who claimed that NATO air
attacks had destroyed only 13 tanks. Significantly, both
the Pentagon and NATO stuck by the numbers briefed at
the time hostilities ceased. USAFE began a major
battlefield survey to glean whatever evidence was left
after the Serb forces pulled out. In this war, however,
the immediate Bomb Damage Assessment resources far
surpassed what had been available in previous conflicts.
Deployed to Aviano, A1C Jerry Heron (driver),
SrA. Jason Caffin (left) and SSgt. Mark Nogel,
of the 81st Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem AB,
Germany, uncase an AGM-65 Maverick before it is
loaded onto an A-10. A break in the weather
meant the A-10s and other forces could resume
the search for targets among the Yugoslav army
forces dispersed throughout Kosovo.
"Airpower alone is capable of rendering the
Yugoslav military ineffective, and that's what
our charter is, that's what our task is, and
that's what we're going to do," said Gen.
John Jumper, Commander, USAFE. (USAF photo by
SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
|
Press reports of decoy tanks and positions also
attracted attention. Ground decoys, deception and
camouflage have been a commonplace feature of air war
since World War I. In the Kosovo crisis, NATO pilots did
hit some decoys, but according to Short, the pilots
"became pretty adept at figuring out what was a
decoy and what wasn't." Jumper was blunt about
putting the decoy issue in perspective as a minor aspect
of the campaign. "We did hit decoys," he said.
"We had plenty of bombs and I was happy to have
Serb manpower employed in the business of making
decoys," he added.
The correlation of battlefield surveys and BDA
reconciliation may never pin down a number of ground
mobile targets destroyed with 100% accuracy, and
Milosevic will probably never tell what happened to his
forces. But the consistent attitude of senior military
officials makes it likely that the immediate
after-action numbers stand a good chance of proving out
to be fairly accurate. The main point is, however many
vehicles were killed, it was enough to take away the
initiative of the Yugoslav ground forces and contribute
mightily to Milosevic' decision to pull them out, lest
they suffer more attrition at the hands of NATO airmen
throughout the summer.
Conclusions
Debate raged over the value of airpower all during
the 78 days of the air campaign. Detailed assessments of
weapons systems performance, the impact on strategic
targets, the effects on ground forces will come with the
conclusion of internal study efforts by the Air Force
and other Pentagon offices.
A pilot from the 510th Fighter Squadron at
Aviano, just returned from an Operation Allied
Force bombing mission. The 510th carried out
numerous strikes on targets across Yugoslavia. (USAF
photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
|
Still, the main outcome is already known. NATO's air
campaign accomplished its objectives. There are no
political officials or military commanders within NATO
who would contend that the war was waged just the way it
should have been. However, the major results are already
in, and they speak volumes about what aerospace power
accomplished and what the Kosovo crisis has taught
airmen.
The main contribution of aerospace power in the
Kosovo crisis was to give the NATO allies a strategy
that fit their military objectives, and their political
consensus--while denying Milosevic the ability to
continue to employ the strategy of his choosing. Air
Vice Marshal Tony Mason, RAF, put it this way: "Milosevic
really wanted us to get into ravines and into gorges. He
really wanted us to relive the Serbian situation in the
1940s."
55
However, the skillful and successful employment of
NATO airpower meant that Milosevic did not stand a
chance of luring the allies into a ground battle. As
Mason summarized, NATO was able to use aerospace power
"to shape an environment, to deny an opponent the
strategy of his choice."56
Aerospace power handed NATO a strategic success because
it let NATO achieve its stated goals while employing its
first-choice force: its airmen. There is perhaps no
better measure of victory than the ability to win by
sticking with the preferred strategy.
For all the ambiguity surrounding Kosovo and its
future, there is no doubt that the air campaign has
brightened the future for the beleaguered province. In
the year before NATO took action, a quarter of a million
Kosovars were made refugees in their own homeland. When
Rambouillet failed, Milosevic massed his forces, bet
against NATO being able to act swiftly, and tried to
steal Kosovo through the most massive and brutal wave of
ethnic cleansing seen to date in the former Yugoslavia.
Diplomacy failed to stop him. By using aerospace power,
NATO was able to force Milosevic to agree to conditions
that allowed the Kosovo refugees to go back home under
international protection. The people of Kosovo now have
at least a better chance to create peace.
Finally, there is no doubt that aerospace power was
the right military tool for the crisis. It was a tough
job, but with an overwhelming effort from the US Air
Force, NATO airmen made the campaign work. The air
campaign got off to a difficult start. Political
constraints, weather, and the deteriorating situation on
the ground in Kosovo came together to set up almost
impossible conditions. In the words of USAFE head
Jumper, "All of those things that remind us of
Vietnam conspired to work against what I would call an
efficient air campaign." However, NATO airmen were
able to do the job, even if they had to do it the hard
way. Even "without the efficiency I would have
hoped for, we were able to do it anyway," Jumper
concluded.
57
Sustained, persistent effort and the combination of
targets made the air campaign effective. Within days of
the start of the campaign, internal NATO guidance had
refocused the effort on the two pillars of air strategy:
strategic targets and fielded forces. Only the adversary
knows what his center of gravity really is. But long
experience has shown that when a leader, like Milosevic,
is using ground forces to carry out his aims, the state
of those ground forces is a crucial part of his power.
At the same time, no modern state functions well when
its electricity, petroleum supplies, communications, and
key transportation nodes are being destroyed. Somewhere
in and amongst these target sets there is a combination
of effects that can make it impossible for the adversary
to keep up the fight. Prudent air planners go after all
these little centers of gravity to foreclose options and
accumulate impact.
In operational terms, the problems associated with
attacking fixed, strategic targets and in going after
ground forces presented two different kinds of
challenges. In the Kosovo crisis, political restrictions
kept NATO airmen away from many key strategic targets.
As targets were released they could be struck with
precision weapons, to great effect and with devastating
efficiency. On the other hand, attacking fielded forces
took time and a big share of the strike aircraft
committed to Operation Allied Force. Because Milosevic's
ground forces were engaged and dispersed, NATO airmen
had to hunt, find, identify, and attack ground forces,
keeping up the pressure with 24-hour air interdiction
operations.
Airmen make a distinction between "strategic
targets" and "fielded forces" when they
plan and execute operations. The difference often
applies as well in assessing the strike results. They
know, however, that the goal is to produce synergistic
effects and that is what the NATO air forces did.
The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
were significantly engaged. Here, two Reserve
F-16 pilots from Shaw AFB, S.C., prepare to fly
Operation Allied Force combat missions from
Aviano. (USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen)
|
To their credit, the alliance airmen delivered their
victory with quiet determination. During the conflict
most airmen kept a hopeful, but sober view of what
aerospace power was being asked to do. "No airman
ever claimed that airpower would be able to stop
genocide, especially genocide that was started long
before the air campaign even started," Jumper
emphasized.
58
USAF Chief of Staff Ryan wrote in early June that
aerospace power was simply "the most available,
effective, and rapid means to strike back against
Milosevic's aggression."
59
"We airmen were wrong in one area,"
conceded Brig. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, Commander of the
31st Fighter Wing at Aviano AB, Italy. "We never
expected that we'd be able to conduct these
extraordinarily complex missions around-the-clock
against robust air defenses without a single combat
fatality."
60
Still, it was "very easy to criticize airpower
for what it did or didn't do," observed Air Vice
Marshal Mason. This meant that the air campaign would
take the heat of criticism and debate-debate that often
sprang from much larger questions about the role of
military force and the timeliness of NATO action. Yet
the fact was "that politically, operationally,
temporally, and for every other conceivable reason, it
could only be airpower, whether airmen wished it to be
airpower on its own or not," he stated. Airmen were
caught between knowing that under ideal conditions they
would have waged the campaign differently-and feeling a
wholehearted commitment to make it work, no matter what
it took.
"Had the United States been planning this
operation, it would have been different," Defense
Secretary Cohen acknowledged in late May. "There
were a lot of difficulties as to how this was put
together," he continued.
61
The air campaign occurred after everything else had
failed. When the diplomats must have been discouraged at
the intransigence of Milosevic, and then at his
violence, the only hope for a shift in the situation lay
with what NATO could do from the air. The quiet
confidence of the US Air Force and its ability to
deliver expeditionary aerospace power under tough
conditions made a big difference at a time when the
alliance itself seemed to ride on the spin of a roulette
wheel.
Leaf offered a straightforward view of the Kosovo
crisis, "The conflict will be described in complex
and diverse terms, and each element subjected to a
microscope. For those of us who fought here, however, it
was really quite simple. This was an old-fashioned
contest between good and evil. Good won."
62
Operation Allied Force required 40% of the Air
Force's tankers. An amazing 80% of the tanker
crews were called to action. This KC-135
Stratotanker from the 117th Air Refueling Wing,
Alabama Air National Guard, in Birmingham, has
just arrived at RAF Brize Norton in the United
Kingdom. (USAF photo by SSgt Randy Mallard)
|
Thoughts for the Future
The Kosovo crisis showed off the mature capabilities
of aerospace power-and its backbone, the US Air Force-at
its very best.
All the elements of aerospace power went through
another cycle of close integration. The Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC) functioned like a weapon system
in itself, as aerospace operators from many different
specialties combined their talents to find targets and
direct strikes to kill those targets. New systems, like
the B-2 with JDAM, proved what precise, all-weather
munitions could do. True to form, the airmen raced to
modify systems like the Predator UAV to increase its
combat capabilities while the war was underway. By the
end of the campaign the warfighters in the CAOC were
able to find new targets and strike them within hours,
often under difficult weather conditions.
Most of all, Kosovo confirmed that expeditionary
aerospace power is the name of the game. Having the
expeditionary aerospace force concept in place helped
the Air Force to calibrate its deployments to Kosovo
while meeting ongoing operations in Southwest Asia and
elsewhere. According to Ryan, Operation Allied Force
demonstrated again that "in almost every situation,
you'll have to have airpower involved," whether for
humanitarian relief, lifting forces or strike
operations.
63
With its expeditionary posture, USAF was able to summon
almost half its forces to the theater and take the lead
in turning around an air war that had been given a shaky
political start. "We were the ones that
surged," Ryan pointed out.
64
For the future, though, Kosovo also held up many
signs. The first was that air superiority remains a
basic precondition for successful military operations,
especially NATO operations. Dealing with air defenses
will continue to be a No. 1 priority. "I can tell
you that what Clark and I worried about every day was
that somehow, Mr. Milosevic would find a way to float an
SA-10 or SA-12 up the Danube River, put it together and
bring it to bear," Jumper recalled. Modern SAMs and
fighters, like the Su-35, "would have had a
profound impact," Jumper warned.
65
Likewise, the F-16CJs proved indispensable to the
operation but were heavily taxed, as were the EA-6Bs.
Several USAF leaders have commented that the whole arena
of electronic warfare and defense suppression will be
re-examined. Other requirements, from air mobility to
precision munitions inventories, will also get a hard
look.
Beyond this, the Kosovo crisis illustrated again that
the art of commanding aerospace power is at the heart of
how America fights. The US Air Force has many new tools
of air warfare, but its most important asset is the
ability of its people to master the execution and the
command of aerospace operations. Cultivating the art of
the aerospace campaign among new generations of airmen
and commanders is still the abiding challenge.
|
Country |
Aircraft |
|
US (Air Force) |
A-10, AC-130, B-1B,
B-2, B-52H, C-5, C-17, C-130,
C-135, C-141, E-3B/C, E-8C, EC-130, F-15, F-15E,
F-16, F-117, KC-10, KC-135, MC-130, MH-53J,
MH-60G, Predator UAV, RC-135, U-2S |
|
US (Other) |
EA-6B
(Navy), F-14 (Navy), F/A-18 (Navy and USMC),
KC-130 (USMC), P-3C (Navy), Hunter UAV |
|
Belgium |
F-16 |
|
Britain |
E-3D,
GR-7, GR1, L-1011K, Tristar, VC-10, aircraft on
HMS Invincible |
|
Canada |
CF-18 |
|
Denmark |
F-16A |
|
France |
C-135F, C-160, E-3F,
F1, Jaguar, Jag-A, Mirage 2000C/D, MIR-IVP, Puma
SA-330, Horizon, UAV CL-289, UAV CR, aircraft on
FS Foch |
|
Germany |
Tornado
PA-200H/E, UAV CL289 |
|
Italy |
AMX, Boeing 707T,
F-104, PA2001, Tornado ADV, aircraft on ITS
Garibaldi |
|
Netherlands |
F-16A,
F-16AM, KDC-10 |
|
NATO Common |
E-3A |
|
Norway |
F-16A |
|
Portugal |
F-16A |
|
Spain |
CASA,
EF-18, KC-130, |
|
Turkey |
F-16, KC-135, TF-16C |
Finis
What about Kosovo itself? Toward the end of the air
war, a NATO official said: "When we look back on
this conflict, the air war may be considered the easy
part. It is going to be much harder to get these people
to forget the violence and live in peace."
66
What about Milosevic? As President Clinton made clear,
removing Milosevic from office was "not part of the
terms that NATO set out at the beginning. That question
is left open."
67
Whatever the course of events in Yugoslavia, NATO air
achieved an impressive set of goals and turned around a
crisis of epic proportions.
A Dutch F-16, like the one pictured here, shot
down a Yugoslav MiG-29 at the beginning of
Operation Allied Force. NATO turned to its
airmen to accomplish objectives after diplomacy
failed. Allied cohesion brought about the
success in Kosovo. "NATO had one consensus
and that was for airpower," said Defense
Secretary Cohen. (USAF photo by SrA. Greg Davis)
|
What does this say about expeditionary aerospace
power? Was it dominant? Yes. The results speak for
themselves. Milosevic's forces suffered high levels of
destruction and agreed to withdraw. In April, they had
the KLA on the run, refugees streaming over the borders
and Kosovo under their control. By June, after 11 weeks
of air attacks, Milosevic had agreed to pull out his
forces and admit NATO peacekeepers. Was it decisive?
Yes. Airpower fulfilled NATO's clear military objectives
of degrading and diminishing the Serb military.
The Kosovo crisis demonstrated that an air campaign
works as the centerpiece of joint operations. For
airmen, this is not a new lesson. It is a legacy of
excellence that reaches back all through the 20th
century. In World War II, in Korea, in Vietnam, in
Desert Storm, airpower has performed its unique and
special role in fighting and winning the nation's wars.
The Kosovo crisis reconfirmed the central role of joint
airpower in modern expeditionary operations.
B-52H Stratofortress crews from the 2nd Bomb
Wing, Barksdale AFB, La., and the 5th Bomb Wing,
Minot AFB, N.D., conduct a formation brief at
their in-theater base, RAF Fairford, UK. The
bombers launched cruise missiles at targets in
Yugoslavia. B-52Hs kept up the pressure from the
first night through the end of the campaign. (USAF
photo by SSgt. Efrain Gonzalez)
|
Using air to attack the enemy's military forces and
targets of unique strategic value is the aerospace
warrior's essential first step to shape and control the
battlespace. The job of airmen is to achieve as many
objectives as possible. In Kosovo, despite many
obstacles, aerospace power did this job well. With
patience, persistence, and precision, NATO airpower
helped force Milosevic to capitulate and to withdraw
Yugoslav forces before NATO peacekeepers came in. That
is what mature aerospace power can do.
50
Dana Priest and Peter Finn, "NATO Gives Air Support
to Kosovo Guerillas," Washington Post, June 2,
1999.
51
Jon R. Anderson, "Underdog KLA Works Its Way
Up," European Stars
52
US Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, CJCS, June 10, 1999.
53
John Keegan, London Daily Telegraph, June 6, 1999.
54
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, news briefing,
June 10, 1999.
55
RAF Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, Eaker Institute
program, "Operation Allied Force: Strategy,
Execution, and Implications," Aug. 16, 1999.
56
Mason, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
57
Gen. John P. Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16,
1999.
58
Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
59
Gen. Michael E. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff, "Air
Power is Working in Kosovo," Washington Post, June
4, 1999.
60
Brig. Gen. Daniel Leaf, Commander, 31st Fighter Wing,
Aviano AB, Italy, June 12, 1999.
61
Richard Parker, "Cohen Admits Flaws in NATO
Strategy," Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, May 29,
1999.
62
Leaf, June 12, 1999.
63
Ryan quoted by John A. Tirpak, "Lessons Learned and
Re-Learned," Air Force Magazine, August 1999.
64
Tirpak, "Lessons Learned and Re-Learned,"
August 1999.
65
Jumper, Eaker Institute program, Aug. 16, 1999.
66
William Drozdiak and Anne Swardson, "Military,
Diplomatic Offensives Produced Agreement,"
Washington Post, June 4, 1999.
67
President Clinton, ABC "Good Morning America."
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The Kosovo Campaign: Airpower Made It Work
