

Gen. Robert Kehler
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Audio/Video playing.

Well, good morning. (Applause). It's a pleasure to be here. Mike, thanks a lot. I'm going to modify Mike's rule just a little bit. Mike says if your cell phone goes off, I encourage you to turn it on, actually, for my speech. He says if it goes off, he says you owe 15 dollars. Five goes to the person next to you who drops a dime on you. I have a little bit of a different modification—if it goes off in the next 30 minutes, see my aide, who will be right in the back here and will collect your money. If you're from the 45th and it goes off, see me in the back and I'll be there with a representative from the personnel center (Laughter.)

I really am delighted to be here. Chief, distinguished leaders, distinguished members of the AFA and others, thanks for coming to this great symposium. I'm going to talk a little bit about some things that are going on around Air Force Space Command. And you saw a very good introduction for the last three minutes of what our people do on a day-in, day-out basis. I feel a little bit like the man that was standing in his living room and with a squeal of breaks and screeching of tires, his wife pulls into the driveway. She runs up the stairs, flings open the door, and says, Honey, I just won the lottery. Pack your bags. And he says, That's great. Should I pack for the mountains or the beach? She says, I don't care. Just get out. (Laughter.)

So we'll see what I've packed for here at the end of my talk. You know I'm always delighted to stand up and showcase the men and women of Air Force Space Command. We do have a contingent of sharks here this morning from the 45th Wing. Good to see all of you. (Shouts.) Good. That's a real pleasure actually to be in this command where we do those things that you just saw in the video and I will tell you, we're very excited about what is happening to our command because I think everybody in this room knows the decisions that were made last fall by the senior Air Force leadership have tremendous impact on Air Force Space Command, the decision to stand up a Global Strike Command and to move 20th Air Force and the land-based strategic deterrent out of Air Force Space Command and into the new Global Strike Command have tremendous impact on our command.

At the same time, to designate us as the lead command for cyberspace in the Air Force and to give us the responsibility to stand up a new numbered Air Force for cyberspace operations is also a tremendous difference for our command, and I'll talk a little bit about both of those this morning, although not directly, because I want to talk about some things that are on my mind and what I think these implications are for us as we look to the future.

Now you saw in the video that I've been able to showcase a couple of very important missions that we already have. One, of course, is the intercontinental ballistic missile

force. About 10 thousand of us served north of Interstate 80 and we continue to provide that ready-capable responsive deterrent force that we've provided for over 50 years. The Air Force's No. 1 one priority is to restore the intensity and focus and capability of our nuclear force and I would tell you that throughout the issues that we've had, and we've had issues, there has never been a question about the enduring capability or credibility of that force. And my assessment has been from the beginning that that force remains capable and strong and ready to perform its mission. The issues that we've had are being addressed. I think we've turned some important corners, but it's not time for high-fiving yet.

Now these airmen secure, operate, and maintain our combat-ready ICBM force, and their dedication, along with the rest of the nuclear enterprise and the Air Force and then beyond is the foundation of the nation's deterrent. It's the foundation of the nation's security. Our allies count on us, our friends count on us. That's an important mission for us, and as I tell our people every day, perfection is the standard. We also recognized in the videos those who conduct our satellite and space launch operations, our other professionals in the space part of our business who have answered the nation's call for duty. There are 39 thousand of us in Air Force Space Command, and we wield capabilities that enable joint commanders to know more about their adversaries, to see the battlefield more clearly, and to strike more quickly and precisely than ever before. Space capabilities provide intelligence that would otherwise be lost, warning that would otherwise be undetected, and communications that would otherwise be impossible. Space is no longer just the high ground, it is an integral part of the joint fight. And today, our space capabilities are embedded in a complex of systems that serve joint forces and commanders at every level and across the spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities from peace through crisis and war. Operational plans and advanced weapons depend on space, as never before and this dependence is likely to increase.

We're looking forward to becoming the lead MAJCOM for cyberspace and to standing up that operational (inaudible) to bring that capability to the fight as well, and I know Major General Bill Lord and his team at the provisional command are working very hard to be ready later on this summer and into the fall as we stand that numbered Air Force up. We're proud of what we bring to the joint team, and what we bring to the joint team every single day, even when they don't know we're bringing it to them. And in many cases, I would offer, that's the best of all worlds. We are bringing tremendous capability to that joint force, and all they know is that it's there. You know that's the old joke about the soldier who stands up and says, I don't need all that space stuff. I've got this GPS thing here. (Laughter). And in a way, although that's a little bit of a stretch, it's not too far from where we have been in the past. Now here's the good news—I think joint commanders around the world today and farther and farther down into the echelons understand and appreciate what space brings to the fight. Here's the bad news, I think joint commanders and echelons farther and farther down understand and appreciate what space brings to the joint fight. That's put a demand on us that changes the way we do our business and thank heaven for it.

So we're proud of what we bring to the joint fight but I think there are a couple of key questions we need to ask ourselves as we look to the future. One, is it enough? And two, are we on the right path as we look to the future? So let's take a minute to think about this. The subject of this symposium is "Cross Domain Integration: Warfare in the 21st Century." So first let me take a minute and consider warfare in the 21st century. I'll quote Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, one of my favorite people for quotes: We're not in Kansas anymore, Toto. Now let me tell you why I think Dorothy was right—if you haven't seen them, there are two, new important and complementary documents on the street that I think back Dorothy up. One is the "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations"—it was just distributed in January and it lays out the Chairman's view about joint operations and the nature of joint operations as we look to the future. The second document, which I think is even more intriguing is a document that was put out by Joint Forces Command back in November called the "Joint Operating Environment," and that gives a perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for joint force leaders as we look to the future.

So what do these documents say about 21st century warfare? Well, one thing they say is that in many cases, Thucydides or Genghis Khan or Sun Tzu or Robert E. Lee or Hap Arnold would recognize much about 21st century warfare because much has not changed. But in other ways, and important ways, it's far more uncertain and complex and changing than ever before, and those historic military leaders would not recognize it today. Now the "Joint Operating Environment" states and let me quote this because I think this is an important context for us in Air Force Space Command and certainly for the Air Force and a larger context for the Joint team and the joint team beyond that. It says, "The next quarter-century will challenge US Joint Forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to sustained engagement in the global commons." That caught our eye at Air Force Space Command because the global commons, in large part, as we look to the future, clearly includes and maybe will be dominated by space and cyberspace.

"During this time," it goes on, "the causes of conflict will vary from rational political conversation to uncontrolled passion. Our enemies' capabilities will range from explosive vests worn by suicide bombers, to long-range precision-guided cyberspace and missile attacks. The threat of mass destruction from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will likely expand from stable nation-states to less-stable states and even non-state networks. It's impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take," which I think is a key piece of this document.

Now the document does go on to say, no one can predict the future but in terms of trying to think our way through it, I think there's a real opportunity for us here to begin to understand something about the nature of warfare in the 21st century and in particular, in Colorado Springs, the view from there suggests that, while much remains the same, there are some important areas here that we need to be particularly mindful of, so let me just throw out Kehler's thinking about the changing nature of warfare and even though war remains a political activity for political ends, everybody who's ever read any of the classics and of course, (inaudible), in particular, knows that that is true. That truism

remains valid as we look to the future, but how we go about that I think will be different, and has big implications for what we're doing in Colorado.

So here are a couple of characteristics that I think are different. It says something about how we have to integrate across the domains. Many of you have heard me say this before, if you assign the value of air as one, and space as one, and cyber as one, one plus one plus one does not equal three; that's new math. It equals a hundred, or it equals 10 thousand, or it equals a million, but it does not equal three. The sum of the integration of our capabilities across the domains is what will be important as we look to the future.

So what characteristics have changed? First I would offer time. Time is different for all of us; if you don't think that time has sped up in your own life, it certainly has in mine. It seems like it does. There's an old truism—everybody gets the same 24 hours of every day, but I'll tell you it seems like we pack more than 24 hours into a time where all we have time to do is work for 24 hours. And oh, by the way, if you look at these three domains inside our United States Air Force, two of those three that are of particular concern to us in Colorado Springs, and think that in the air we can wield power in let's say minutes to hours, depending on where airpower is, and how quickly we can bring it to bear. In space, I would offer that we can wield power in seconds to minutes, depending on where the platform is in orbit, perhaps, depending on what it's purpose is. In cyberspace, we can wield power in milliseconds—that's going to cause us to think completely differently about the time dimension of how we conduct operations as we look to the future.

Distance is the second one that I think changes pretty dramatically because it doesn't matter if you're sitting at a computer terminal how far away someone else is. Distance in terms of miles is irrelevant. You can reach out and touch someone or communicate with someone or interact with someone really at the speed of light, and we're talking about milliseconds or seconds if you're talking about processing time in some cases.

Boundaries are different. You know sometimes I think that boundaries are those things that we draw to confuse ourselves and help the enemy because space and cyberspace don't respect geographic boundaries. It isn't the same concept in space and cyberspace. There are boundaries there, but the space boundary is largely where Bernoulli meets Kepler. The cyber boundary, I would argue, is maybe a legal boundary, or a moral boundary. Some other boundary, but it is not a physical boundary the way we have come to think of conducting military operations in the past. That's going to give us all kinds of problems as we look to the future, but also opportunities; challenges for sure.

The next thing that I think is different that we've taken note of out in Colorado is ambiguity. We are dealing with a lot more information today than ever before and the volume of information is going up. That says something about how we command and control. That says something about how we share information. In my last job, we had a saying—there's a command chain but there's not an information chain. There has to be a command chain, although even that, I would argue, is changing some in that we are pushing decisions farther and farther and farther down the command chain because of the differences in time and speed and boundaries. Ambiguity is something that military

commanders have always dealt with, but I think that's a tougher challenge today, and part of our responsibility will be how do we wield space and cyberspace to help cut through the ambiguity that contributes to fog and friction.

Volume of information is going up tremendously; if you're like I am, you're way overloaded. One of my favorite cartoons in the Sunday paper—some of you have heard me say this before—is a cartoon called Zits. It's about this teenage boy and his hard-pressed parents. Those of you that had teenagers you know what this is like. And one of my favorite ones, a couple of months ago; here is this young man and he's schlumped over the couch. You know how teenagers are, he's kind of falling over the couch, and he has a laptop sitting there on his lap, he's got an iPod in his ears, he's got a cell phone in one hand, and he had something else, some other electronic device, in the other hand. And in the text box over top of his head, you can't read any text at all. It's just jumbled words on top of jumbled words; it's almost a completely black text box. His mother walks in and says, "How are you?" and a box goes by, he doesn't say anything. "How are you?" And he says, you know, he mumbles, "Fine." She looks at her husband and says, "He doesn't communicate very well, does he?" Now I can feel for that, by the way, I've got two sons. They're beyond teenage years and they still don't call, but that's a different story. (Laughter). But I will tell you when they do call, it is clear to me that I'm not the only person they're communicating with. They're probably playing a video game, talking to their friends, you know I don't know what they're doing, and that's probably good, but I know that they're communicating in ways that I can never communicate, and that volume of information they've got is something that I have a lot of trouble with.

And finally, what's different in my view is symmetry. If you want to take on the United States of America, you don't do it straight up, you find an asymmetric way to do it. You pull us out of our vehicles and you put us in the street. Or, you get in the middle of an urban area, and I would offer that cyberspace is a densely packed urban area. There are a lot of people in cyberspace. They are going to the library, they're going to school, they're going shopping. They are conducting their business; some of them are traveling, others are communicating with their friends. But also in cyberspace, we have vandals, we have criminals, we have spies, we have militaries operating in there. I tell our people, when you come to work and log onto Nippernet you are entering a combat zone, and everyone has to be a defender. We don't have a security forces squadron for cyberspace. And it is not the (inaudible) of the CICS. It's everybody's job to be a defender of cyberspace.

So what does all this mean for us in Air Force Space Command? Well, I think we have our work cut out for us. We have to field the space and cyberspace force with attributes that are more flexible, more capable, and more adaptable to both change and surprise because one thing that both the "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations" and the "Joint Operating Environment" will tell you is, that surprise is a given, and we have to deal with it just like military commanders have always had to deal with surprise. The enemy is a real thinking, breathing entity. They get a vote in what is going on, and they are smart. They are as smart as we are. In some cases, their rules allow them to behave like they're even smarter because they don't have the same kind of constraints and restraints that we have.

So here's some things that I think we have to do as I look to the future and we begin to take on this cyber mission, and we keep our focus drilled down tightly onto the deterrent force until the very day that we hand that over to Global Strike Command, and by the way, even beyond, because there will be some period of time here that there will be a transition period. And I will tell you this, we will remain absolutely committed in Colorado Springs to the success of that deterrent force. We have learned a lesson here, and that lesson will reverberate I can tell you in our command for a long time. The other day, my 14th Air Force commander looked around and said, you know that "perfection is a standard" line applies to 14th Air Force as well. And I couldn't agree with him more. And oh, by the way, that "perfection is a standard" line applies to the new Cyber NAF when we stand that up and I couldn't agree with that more. In fact, perfection is the standard applies across the United States Air Force, I would argue.

And we know how to define perfection. We define perfection in absolute adherence to the standards we've laid out. That's what I ask of the folks starting in 20th Air Force, reminding them of this again, extending that to 14th Air Force. That'll certainly be true as we take on cyber, so what do we have to do? Well, No. 1, I would argue, in space and cyberspace, both, we must improve our situational awareness. We've got to answer some tough questions of senior people when something happens, and those questions, I think there are four of them—What happened? Who did it? What are the consequences? And what are my options? That puts a very tough set of challenges in front of us when we're talking about space and even tougher when we're talking about cyberspace. What happened? Who did it? Sometimes, describing what happened is hard enough, when you have to attribute; is this a natural thing that happened? Was it an accident that happened? Or was this a determined activity by someone that means to do us harm? What are the consequences, which sounds pretty easy on the surface, but when you think about some of the space platforms, in particular, and how they are intertwined with coalition activities, and some are allied platforms, and some are consortium activities; what happened, who did it—that gets to be a fairly interesting challenge. What are the consequences is an even bigger challenge, and what are the options, the option can't be—well, you've got that nuclear deterrent force. Yeah, you do, but that's at one end of the spectrum here that you hope you never get to. What do we do short of that, and I would argue this is where cross domain integration comes in. It's not about retaining the capabilities of space things; it's about retaining the capability. And maybe the best way to protect space things is with air things that do that capable activity.

Ok, second, we've got to increase our protection. These are critical capabilities that we have here. We've got to get better at cyber defense, pure and simple. When you look around and see what we're doing in cyberspace today, all of the things that we do—information conditions—all the things that we do are admiration of something that has already happened. We've got to get better at this. It's got to be predictive; by the way, that ties closely to situational awareness and it certainly applies across our domains. A year ago, I had the great privilege to visit Gary North's people out in the AOR, and one of the things that we did, we were out on the flight line getting a tour, and some of you heard me telling the story about the B-1. I went out and stood in front of the B-1; the crew was there, the pilot said, "Hey you're that space guy." So I was thinking I probably

have to talk to you about how I use space, and he said, I started out thinking that it was really about GPS because no question about it, I can draw a direct line between what I do and GPS. Then I started to think about it, and it turns out that every single thing I do, from mission planning to mission recovery involves space at some level, and that got me to thinking—think about that B-1 in flight right after it releases a JDAM. The issue isn't the B-1, the issue is the JDAM. The issue is some battlefield commander needs a target taken out. That's the issue. That B-1 is not an air platform, it's almost an air-space-cyber platform. You almost say that as one word, and I think that's going to increase as we look to the future. We've got to think about ourselves that way.

So the next point that we got to do better is we got to integrate across the domains. As I said, one plus one plus one does not equal a hundred. It certainly doesn't three; it equals a lot more than that, but only if we do this right, and we have a lot of work to do to integrate across those domains. How do we do it? Well, people ask me that all the time. It starts with, you got to integrate architectures. You've got to integrate doctrine. You've got to integrate TTPs and warfighting combat operations because we don't integrate in a great extent inside our MAJCOMs, we're not set up that way. We have to integrate in those other structures in our Air Force where those activities are at the forefront. The Air Force Warfare Center, for example, at Nellis, is the place where we integrate combat activities. That's where we practice them, that's where we train them, that's where the flags are. And that's how we get (inaudible) because we have a doctrine center, and that's where doctrinal integration should occur, and we've got people and structures in our Air Force to do warfighting integration. We've got a staff element in the Pentagon who comes to work with that on their door everyday—warfighting integration. So, we can integrate, but this is hard. It's hard work. We need to share information. As I said before, this is not about an information chain. There is always a command chain, but information's going to have to flow through that chain, and around that chain into the lowest levels all the time. And then you get to go in and pick out what you need. We've got to develop and deploy capabilities faster. Some of you have heard me talking about deploying capabilities at the speed of need. We do not have an acquisition process today that will serve us well as we look to the future; everyone knows it. Fixing it is fiendishly hard, but we know we need to fix it, and when you talk about space and cyberspace, that acquisition process has got to go from something that looks like this to something that looks like this. We will not have the luxury, as we look to the future, being able to go through the acquisition process as we have known it in the past.

Next, we've got to expand our team. We've got to embrace industry in a different way and a better way and a more effective way. We've got to embrace our allies, especially in space and cyberspace, and our coalition partners, and finally, we need to be mindful of the capabilities that we're deploying. We've got to make sure that we can deploy things on time and on cost, and they've got to be meaningful capabilities that contribute to the joint fight. And I think there's a very interesting set of issues that come with that as we look at what capabilities we need and how we go about it.

So 21st century warfare might largely be irregular warfare, and certainly the emphasis on irregular warfare is going up, and we're going to have to counter irregular warfare tactics in space and in cyberspace if we're going to maintain our capability to support

the warfighter. Cyberspace, I would offer, is the epitome of irregular warfare. The threat changes, everybody's a potential threat, you're not quite sure what are the targets and the hackers are, and as I said, it's a densely packed urban area. The fight is on there and make no mistake about it, the fight is on in cyberspace. The adversary can be down the street or half-way around the world, and you never know; the adversary could look like they're half-way around the world and be down the street, or the adversary could be half-way around the world and be using equipment that's down the street, which gives us a real set of issues. We're all net defenders.

Irregular and regular warfare, though, in Colorado Springs, doesn't look a whole lot different in terms of the impact that it has on space and cyberspace. Because those forces are inherently global in effect. We deliver capabilities in space and cyberspace that transcend boundaries and that are intrinsically and simultaneously tactical and strategic, local and global. They operate at a high operations tempo all the time in peace, in crisis and conflict, changing only their priorities and focus as a given scenario unfolds. So that makes our challenge enormous, I think, much like my colleagues in the other MAJCOMs. Irregular warfare is something that we are paying a great deal more attention to, but in my world, and in the world that we are struggling with every day in Colorado Springs, regular and irregular warfare look about the same for what we have to be able to do everyday.

So we've got a perspective out there that influences the way we command and control, it influences the way we present our forces, and it influences the way we develop and acquire those forces because it has to do with a global perspective, and in using that global perspective to get down to the tactical and the local level. So this is a big job for us. We're having a terrific time out there. I can't tell you, there isn't a day that goes by—sometimes I call the Chief and I say, "Chief, I've got the best job in the Air Force," and he balks a little bit at that and says "I don't know." Then I say, "I've got the best view in the Air Force," and he generally agrees with me, that I have the best view in the Air Force. I think I've got the best job in the Air Force, although I recognize that every MAJCOM commander would stand up and say the same thing.

I was sitting in the barber chair, not so long ago, and a kid walks in. Barber leans over and says, "Watch this. This is the dumbest kid in the world." So he takes two quarters out of his cash register and he takes a dollar bill out of his cash register. He says to the kid, "Hey, kid, which of these do you want?" The kid comes over and takes the two quarters and leaves. Barber says, "See, that's the dumbest kid in the world." So I finish my haircut, I walk down the street, I go into the 7-11 and there stands the kid with a big jarful of quarters, and he's buying everything he can possibly find. And I walk over to him and say, "Hey, just out of curiosity, why do you take the quarters instead of the dollar?" He says, "If I take the dollar, the game's over." (Laughter.) Dumbest kid in the world. I didn't go back to that barber anymore. I thought, I don't want to go to the dumbest barber in the world.

OK, so you know are we dumb kids? Are we dumb barbers? What are we? It's about the rules of the game. It's about how you play the game, it's about understanding about the rules. It's about being perceptive in something that we need to be perceptive in. I can't

thank you enough for inviting me to come. I really appreciate being able to speak here. I spoke last year as well, and as I hope I've highlighted to you, much has changed in the year that has gone by since I stood up here last. Mike, thanks to you and AFA for hosting us, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. (Applause).

Dunn: Thank you, General Kehler. I have a whole pile of questions. Let me start with a few controversial ones.

Kehler: Gosh, Mike, look at the time. You know it's a shame that we're out of time already.

Dunn: Two satellites collide, so do we need some kind of space air traffic control?

Kehler: Well certainly the notion of rules of the road. There are two pieces to this that are going to get a lot of attention. It's already getting a lot of attention in the press. One is some kind of regime of rules of the road. The other is arms control, and in both of those cases, we're actually looking forward to this discussion. We're standing ready to provide our best military advice, which we will certainly be ready to do, and we'll give the policymakers a hand. I will tell you that there are some intriguing issues that surround both of those, and they're very hard. There are questions about definitions, there's questions about verifications, and there's certainly going to be a lot to talk about as we look to that.

Dunn: I've got time for one last question, I'll let the audience kind of choose it. I have one here from a four-star general and one here from a captain. Which one do you want me to ask? (Audience answers.) The captain's? OK. General Chilton said yesterday that he thought that this just-in-time deployment of space satellite is just a little too much for his comfort level, and he talked about that we need a little robustness in this area. The question is, would the current EELV launch rate DOD payload significantly less than designed in the rapidly building satellite manifest over the next few years. Is there an issue here? Are we supporting the warfighter with what they need in terms of space capabilities?

Kehler: Well, there are a lot of questions in there, so let me take a step back and try it this way. We operate our space capabilities based on a strategy that we have worked out over a number of years. At the one of this strategy, we have said that the way we ought to construct our space platforms themselves is with a view that a relatively small number of very complex and high-value platforms is the way we will go. In part, we got to that because of our desire to not launch anymore than we absolutely had to do.

Another part of that strategy says that we are going to size our launch capabilities based on what we would think would sort of be the routine way of doing business. Another part of that strategy has been that we do not, we typically do not, fill the barn with spares and back-ups and other capabilities that we can rapidly deal with problems when they emerge. So, I think General Chilton's point is a good one. As the combatant commander, he has got to make risk assessments based upon the capabilities that he needs. Here's how we're getting at this. First of all, we're looking very hard at this notion

that one type of satellite, or one large satellite, will fit all situations. My personal view is that one size does not fit all, and we have to go address that as a strategic way forward, because if you say that we have an opportunity here maybe for smaller platforms that are single-mission purpose, that they are focused on the mission, we can reduce the cost and if you can reduce the cost you can begin to work the risk of what happens if I lose one of these, because maybe you can have a different replenishment philosophy. The GPS constellation comes to mind. We have a different philosophy for GPS than we do for the rest of our satellite constellations.

And then finally, there's this issue about sizing the capacity of the launch activity. We don't call it this in Air Force Space Command, but essentially, in the launch business, we buy flying hours. We have bought a certain capacity. We can offer a certain number of launch slots, and beyond that you have to fund more flying hours, if you will. Again, we don't call it that, but that's what we're going to have to go look at.

The final part that I would mention to you, and we are looking at that, by the way, and in our command, that's the launch enterprise transformation vision that we have. We've got to reduce the costs; if you can reduce the cost, you can sustain better, you can increase the launch tempo, I think, without a lot of additional investment. And then finally we're working our way through operationally responsive space and the concept that goes with that and the hardware that goes to that. ORS is a national strategic capability, and that's the way we need to view ORS. We are not developing a handful of things that will be responsive, we are developing responsiveness, and that begins with the existing platforms on orbit, and how we're going to use 10 (inaudible-cap?) a different way and it extends into what the labs are working on now for plug-and-play satellites, with plug-and-play sensors that we're going to be able to treat like we have always treated a U-2, a platform that is out there on the ramp with a multitude of sensors that can go on it to fit the mission with a common ground system and a way that we can command and control that makes it part of the fight.

So that's a long answer to a long question. It's a multiple series of things, but we've got to do better for the combatant commander because he's right, our strategic way forward has put us in a position where we've got difficulties when we lost a capability.

Dunn: General Kehler, on behalf of Joe Sutter, the Chairman of the Board of AFA, and all of us at AFA we want to thank you for a very intriguing presentation. Thank you for joining us this morning.

Kehler: You bet. Thank you all. (Applause.)

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