

Feb. 27, 2009
Gen. John D. W. Corley
Commander, Air Combat Command
Orlando, Fla.

Conversations heard in the front of the room that you may not be (inaudible) to. First, you heard General Lorenz very articulately say that he was provided a choice, a choice which was to forego his video and be on the platform up at the podium with Don Hoffman; a conversation you may not have heard in the front of the room. As they left, Don Hoffman turned to Steve Lorenz and said, "I would have taken the video." (Laughter).

Look, I first want to begin, if I could by, saying thanks to the AFA. I want to thank not only Mike who introduced me, and it was a kind introduction, but I want to thank the AFA also for not just the introduction but the invitation to be able to participate. I want to say thanks to all those individuals that are in the audience with us today. You are here as partners, partners which are air-minded, partners which are both service partners and industry partners, and I congratulate you and I thank you for what you have done in terms of service to this great nation.

Next, if I could, I'd like to spend just a couple of seconds of time giving you a brief outline of what it is I'd like to share, if I could. And it kind of comes into maybe four not-so-easy pieces—where we were, where we are, where we're going, and maybe a piece that I've added, finally, why it's important. Because you see, during the early portions of the session I decided to sit at the back of the room, to sit with our youngsters, some of those individuals that perhaps don't quite have the benefit of the years that we have. And so for them, with an awful lot of change in front of them, they're wondering—what is enduring? And so if you'll bear with me, this will be a bit lengthy, and I talked to Mike about that, and Mike said it would be OK because your presentation was remarkably short last year, so in the aggregate it will average out.

For those of you that don't recall my early statements last year, it went this way: we were on the cusp of saving General Carlson, because General Carlson had uttered a number, and the number that General Carlson had uttered was 381. Being not a slow learner last year, I submitted by script for security and policy review, and when I did I was returned the redacted version. The redacted version said the following: "Good morning and thank you for the opportunity for allowing me to talk." (Laughter).

Today, not being a slow learner I have not submitted this script for security and policy review. So it will be a little bit lengthy, and so now let's talk about the significance of why it is I'd like to talk about those four parts. One, where we were; because there's always revisionism in history and I want to take that time machine and us back to one year ago to what I said to you, and then I want to compare and contrast that to where we are today one year later so you can begin to grade some of the homework and decide what progress has, and in some respects, has not been made. I think it's important for all of us to understand where we are going, at least from a Combat Air Force perspective which is nested inside of an Air Force perspective. We need to have a path and

understand where we're going. And then finally we need to, if you will, (inaudible) re-educate, re-learn the lessons of why all this is important for our nation.

So first on deck, if you will, let me go back that one year ago, and we'll try to establish that baseline, if you will. One year ago where was I, and what was I speaking about? I was speaking about the enduring importance, if you will, of air dominance. I talked about how the ability to provide global vigilance, global reach, and global power was predicated upon continuance of air dominance. I talked about how unrivaled capability, but remember I also talked about with appropriate capacity, were the prerequisites to do what—prerequisites for the ability to ensure global vigilance, reach, and power through air dominance. At the time, you may also remember that we had just recently returned F-15s to flying status. That had been following one incident where an aircraft had literally snapped in half. Had we not made that decision to ground that fleet we would have never discerned the root cause, we would have never figured out that there were nine more of those aircraft that were going to suffer a similar feat, and with the likelihood that maybe the aviator would not have come from that.

One year ago, I illustrated my concern over the systemic problem of aging fleets, and the need for both recapitalization and a hybrid solution of modernization. While at the same time if we took into context what was going on inside of the world I think we found that maybe some of those potential adversaries were continuing to make pretty remarkable technological advancements and developments, and I talked about the beginning of a Combat Air Force strategic plan. I talked about a potential for a Combat Air Force strategic plan that would be integrated, it would be synchronized, it would be coherent. And it would get all those planning efforts inside of a single document. That's probably where I'd like to spend the majority of our time today talking, if I could.

Now, with that as a little bit of a baseline, so where are we now? And if you can and will allow me, let's fast-forward to that year, and let's examine where we are. It's another year's passed, and our aircraft are another year older, and I spoke about the challenges of an older fleet and those challenges turned out to not just be isolated to the F-15. Following the F-15 problem we had the problem with the A-10s as discussed by General Hoffman on this stage. Today, we have 108 A-10s with cracked wings that are grounded today; 53 more that are yet to be assessed. If the numbers continue to work we'll probably have another 10 or so A-10s that will be grounded. The reality of the aging aircraft fleet dictates that we're going to have to make the difficult choices that the Chief and the Secretary talked to us about. Budget constraints are going to demand that we simply cannot choose, however, between modernization and recapitalization, in my mind. The demands posed on our people and the equipment by these current operations along with the potential dangers posed by perhaps even more complex and more difficult challenges of the future are going to dictate that we simply can't choose between improving current capabilities and developing future capabilities. We have got to strike the word that the Secretary used, "strike the balance". And it's the balance between modernization and recapitalization. We've got to meet the challenges of today while continuing to prepare for the future.

That strategy is going to involve some risk, inherent risk in that strategy in trying to achieve that balance. We've got to get it right or at least more right than where we are today, in my mind.

And I think our Air Force, and more importantly our airmen, have got to remain air-minded in this to get it more right. So, part of the where we are, though, has got a good news story to it, and the good news story is really led by the ladies and the gents that are right in front of you. When you think about the Pacific Air Forces, USAFE, if you think about AFSpace, if you think about AFSOC, if you think about the National Guard, the Reserve component, if you think about even our Provisional AFCyber, in 2008, they all had tremendous success. What kind of success—success in creating and delivering increasingly successful inventories of warfighting capabilities. We've increased our ISR capabilities at unprecedented levels, we're doing that with Predators and Reaper CAFs today. We're flying 20 thousand hours on a monthly basis; we're progressing so fast from the Secretary's speech yesterday, we've gone from 400 thousand to 500 thousand hours. We're in excess of a half a million hours in terms of the flying mark.

The MC-12—we've taken the MC-12, which was just an idea on DOD's drawing board in a handful of months, to operational capability and operations squadrons flying this spring in conflict. We've moved aggressively by providing resources need to the front lines. That demand, if you will, for ISR, for full-motion video, for SIGINT, and as we grow even increasingly, into GMTI. We're going beyond the capabilities of just unmanned fleets and that's why programs like Project Liberty are the right capability for where we are now. We're the right amount of, I would argue, versatility.

Irregular warfare, and our focus there—we've led the way in terms of Air Force general purpose forces to support IW. We've drafted the first irregular warfare operating concept. We've developed IW and COIN light aircraft attack opportunities and potentials. We've had the rapid fielding, as I said, of the MC-12, and we've used that to best fill some of those combatant commander requirements for not just the war but for also potentials for building partnership capacity. We've chaired an IW senior summit in Washington, DC, to try to assist our Chief in terms of where he takes our Air Force and the way forward in irregular warfare, and it's all been in step with Air Force priorities.

We've reinvigorated also, what's been said from this stage repeatedly, our Nuclear Enterprise. You know, providing this nation, our nation, with credible and secure strategic deterrent force, it's among the most important missions Air Force not just does today but has shouldered and borne since we became an independent service. That's not an area where we simply manage risk; that's an area where perfection will always remain the standard. Our increased focus on the Nuclear Enterprise led us to the establishment of the Global Deterrence Force, so that we could continue to do it, to build expertise, if we will. We reestablished the practice of no-notice nuclear surety inspections as well as revising our weapons handling instructions. We've programmed a 4th B-52 squadron and we expanded Task Force 204. For some of you that may not be quite as familiar, originally envisioned, Task Force 204 would only be stood up when we generated nuclear bombers. Today, we committed to the additional resources and the full standup of that and the decision was made to have that on a full-time, as a conduit

for what, as a conduit to Kevin Chilton, Commander—USSTRATCOM, between Kevin and the United States Air Force. And we established an unambiguous chain of authority and accountability. I don't think there should be any doubt in this room that that mission, that expertise, is in our blood, and it'll always remain that way. And I'm proud of how we've responded to that, and I'm proud of what our airmen have accomplished.

So yesterday, another thought process. I sat in the back of the room and I listened, because I listened to the youngsters, who No. 1 said, "Boss you don't understand that you have a seat in the front of the room," but I wanted to hear things from their perspective, and the thing that was going on inside their mind is, with all of this change, what is enduring? What is the path? What is the plan? How will we deal with it? And perhaps I'd like to propose at least one airman's collective answer with his brothers and partners here in terms of how we can discern answers to some of those solutions, and it fits and goes to the 'where are we going' part. So where are we going? We know in our minds that we have got to fight and plan and build a dominant Combat Air Force for America today and for the future. The flight plan that I'd like to talk about is this Combat Air Force strategic plan. It's a plan that in my mind nests perfectly inside of the broader Air Force strategic plan of our Chief and our Secretary. You see, we have to have a structure, we have to have framework, we have to know where we're going, and we've got to at the same time take into the context the neighborhood that we're living in. and I don't know about you but my assessment of this 21st century strategic environment presents some pretty uncertain and pretty dynamic pictures that are framed, not just by the current conflicts in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq, but there's also a potential for broader ranges of potential conflicts and adversaries. We have to plan to address the full spectrum of challenges.

Can I have the first slide please? Here's what I want you to take away in terms of importance of this. Inclusive, not exclusive; collaborative. Notice that there's eight signatures on here inside of the combat air forces plan and it's a plan, oh by the way, that appropriately works with Art Lichte's Mobility Air Forces plan and Steve Lorenz's Air Education and Training Plan and Don Hoffman's supportability plan; inclusive, not exclusive. It was made and developed with the brothers and sisters across the portfolio; Air Force Space, PACAF, USAFE, Special Ops, National Guard, Reserves, and Cyber. This plan, as I said, is the result of an inclusive coordinated endeavor that I think is necessary to focus our efforts and our resources. It gives us a framework, if you will, for providing that dominant Air Force for our nation. It provides the linkage between a national, a Department of Defense, other services, Air Force strategic guidance, and our CAF activities. The foot bone has got to connect to the ankle bone, in my mind, and here's the inclusive plan that I would propose.

Next slide, please. One of the first things you see from this is I'm not a PowerPoint ranger, it appears to be somewhat cartoonish, but if you look at this, and we'll cover the slide from top to bottom from left to right in an ins ways and means construct. I think you'll find that this Combat Air Force strategic plan articulates what we provide the nation, what is expected of our Combat Air Force by the nation: global vigilance and global power. You know in October of this year the Chief put out a document, said "the ability to gain and maintain awareness plus the ability to hold at risk or strike targets

anywhere in the world”—that’s why we have a Combat Air Force. That’s why it’s nested together, collaboratory, across our services, so we can deliver on that. And it’s got to be accomplished and created with the synergies through integration of air and space and cyber. And that integration, in my mind, is what gives us the ability to prevent potential global adversaries from engaging in activities that contradict our national objectives and our infrastructure. It brings us to a key step along the path if you look at that first CAF end, which is called dissuasion and deterrence.

We’re going to drill on that a lot today during this somewhat lengthy presentation, and I think as you go along that path and continue from left to right on the in’s side, you’ll see that we also need the ability to see first, understand first, and then to act first, and in my mind this is decision superiority, being able to make sound, fact-based decisions, correct decisions, and make them faster than your enemy can. There’s also some places where it gets a little bit tricky because you see as we execute this flight plan there’s going to be places where we’re going to hit some unexpected turbulence like you’re seeing right now in the national construct. One constant as far as turbulence also is the adversary; sophisticated adversaries, what their main goal is to do what—to deny us freedom of action. I will remain committed to freedom of action in terms of a Combat Air Force enduring end. Things change, some things remain, and remain enduring. And those sophisticated adversaries will try to prevent us from being free from attack or free to attack.

Another step as we move out to the right is, how would somebody get us off our game and get us off our strategy, and that’s why I think it’s appropriate as an end for us as a Combat Air Force and for an Air Force that delivers on vigilance and power, is this concept of persistent pressure. Use of multidimensional capabilities to pre-duce (?) and reduce our adversary’s ability to adapt and overcome our own strategies. This is a collective, if you will, across those ends, destination of sort, it’s the enduring Combat Air Force ends in my mind. It’s dissuade and deter; it’s decision superiority; it’s freedom of action, it’s persistent pressure. And that’s where we’re going. In my mind, that’s what underpins our Air Force, and more importantly our national strategy by delivering on those ends in partnership with Art Lichte’s mobility plan, with Steve’s training plan, with Don’s supportability plan.

Let’s take the slides down please. I’m going to spend a little more time walking through there’s before I get back to why I think it’s important for, if you will, the younger in our audience. When we talk about why do we have an independent Air Force and what airmen believe, I don’t think there’s any better place to start with that rationale than with dissuasion and deterrence. You know we got a little bit of a history lesson early from on the stage from General Graves, and I’m glad he did that because from the very beginning there are great air-minded and airpower advocates, thinkers—Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, they saw a way, perhaps, of reducing the horrors of attrition warfare. The air instrument and now we could move that forward to other domains of space and cyber, held a promise, and the promise was an ability to wage war effectively and to do it from another dimension, but more importantly once it had been observed doing so it would discouraged potential adversaries from entering into a fight to begin with. It’s the ‘dissuade and deter’ that our Chief talked about yesterday.

There's some pretty obvious examples but I don't know if any one better than what was our nuclear forces during the Cold War. The desired end state, really, for what turned out to be a standoff between the US and the Soviet Union, actually didn't involve war at all, and it certainly didn't involve a world war. Rather, it was a "deterrence competition," if you will, and it involved building alliances, if you will, dissuading rivals, dissuading them from what—from becoming enemies and deterring enemies from miscalculating about our US strength and our national will. We pursued aggressive developments and operational ways necessary to dissuade, deter, and eventually we got ourselves over (?) the nuclear triad. We were able to achieve and envisioned that end of dissuading and deterring for 40 years in the Cold War and I think for all of us in this room, the credibility of that has given us a nuclear peace that thankfully remains unbroken today.

Another one of those enduring ends that we talked about from left to right on that chart; decision superiority. I'd argue that does not happen by (inaudible) stance and it doesn't happen by action. Although we've encountered some luck along the way most of our successes had been a result of preparation, that's why we have to have a path and a plan and understand where we're going to each of these ends. We're diligent in our efforts to collect and interpret data and then use that to build situation awareness and expedite the decision-making process for our commanders. Decision superiority seeks to do just that. When this end is realized, we provide, who, the joint warfighting commander, and decision makers the understanding they need to make informed decisions, quality decisions, and act effectively in today's exceptionally complex and dynamic environment. And this involves more than just technology, in my mind. It's not just about the sensors, it's not just about the platforms, because those sensors, those platforms, are going to be worthless, without what—without flexible, adaptive thinkers, strategists, planners, and commanders that can build knowledge and, maybe more importantly, understanding from the information our systems provide.

Lessons in history—turn it back to Desert Storm—air and space forces from national assets, to the first use of JSTARS, operating and providing picture unprecedented in terms of warfare. The data was fed to a truly joint air operations center. Key joint force—land, air, and component commanders had that big picture. They had fused Intel and knowledge and development capabilities so they could understand the environment better than their adversary, decide faster, act correctly, and then assess the actions, and often times they were doing that before the enemy had an opportunity to act at all. I would argue it was just a point where we'd built upon, we'd spent decades from Desert Storm, geometrically increasing situation awareness and knowledge building. It's resulted in greater understanding, not less, and it's given superior decision-making ability. It's become so good, often times, that we in the Air Force and the Joint force often times take that awareness and that management and development for granted, and they shouldn't.

Another enduring end—freedom of action as we continue to drill into these left and right; to shape a conflict, in my mind, and thereby the outcome, the Joint force must establish freedom of action, the ability to operate in and through all of the warfighting domains without prohibitive interference. It provides the Joint force the ability to

dictate the time, the place, the tempo, of military operations, so let's tug at it for just a second. How do we even know it exists? I think it can only exist by establishing and maintaining air and space and cyberspace superiority. Today, as we look across the globe there's an awful lot of rising peers, there's new peers out there, and they're doing what—they're assessing us, and they're looking at the asymmetric advantages that we provide, and they understand that as an advantage and they will attempt to take it away from us. We can't allow that to happen. To retain freedom of action, we can't just rely on the F-22, but we've got to include other advanced ISR platforms and situational building capabilities, both space and air and cyber, and merge them together in an integrated fashion. There has to be a Global Hawk, there has to be a Predator, a Reaper, a JSTARS with an MP-RTIP, an increasing capability with resilient airborne and terrestrial networks. We've also got to bring together advanced airborne electronic attack capabilities, new EAA pods, standoff and stand-in jamming, MALD-J. If we bring all those together in a systems approach to do this, we'll better be able to enable airmen to operate in that contested airspace and to conduct precision strikes against those critical targets that we have to hold at risk or show the credibility that we can hold at risk, so that we can deter and dissuade. If superiority gets established, then land and maritime components have that freedom to operate on the surface when and where they want as well as we bring together all the partnerships.

The last one I wanted to talk about in terms of at least the ends before we delve a bit into the ways, is this thought process behind persistent pressure. You know as an effective military force we possess the ability to ensure continuous freedom of action for our ground forces, and to deliver precise coercive effects; big words. But once we've entered into a conflict and established decision superiority and freedom of action, persistent pressure is what's going to be required to preclude an adversary from denying us our ends. Through consistent and broad application of power, broad application of power and pressure in a persistent fashion, that's the way we'll shape the outcome. We ultimately defeat an enemy's strategy by outpacing their ability to adapt to ours. We're focused on doing this right now. Gary North has talked to you, he's doing it inside of Iraq and Afghanistan. He's got ISR assets that are aloft, that are staring down at the battle space searching for and tracking insurgents and their movement. He's got fighters and bombers on station, kinetically, ready to prosecute a target or provide the required effect necessary. Air, space, and ground-based command and control networks are enabling and ensuring the mission. They're providing that persistent pressure.

Below those ends of where we're going are a set of ways. And all enduring ends can only be achieved through ways, ways like global attack, surface dominance, battle space awareness, agile combat support, force presentation, persistent engagement. We were able to prevail in my mind through the Cold War with dissuasion and deterrence, and the way we did that was achieved through global attack our ability, our Air Force's ability, to rapidly attack, anywhere at any time with credibility. It was unique to the United States Air Force. It was indispensable as an instrument of national power. Decision superiority in a way as we move through that, achieved in Operation Desert Storm not just through but through also battle space awareness, but also through surface dominance, physically, psychologically destroying a regime's leadership, strategy, forces, infrastructure.

Today we're able to reach ends in Iraq and Afghanistan like we have not in previous times in history in partnership with our Joint brothers and sisters and our other allies. Using means like Predator, Reaper, Global Hawk, and soon Project Liberty, to create this unprecedented battle space awareness, utilizing those ISR capabilities to ascertain the status or contribute to the status of our enemy combatants, not in hours, but literally in real time, and using these platform sensors and operators to provide persistent pressure as a way; giving insurgents limited or no sanctuary for them, denying them freedom of action, fully integrating these capabilities with our Joint and coalition ground forces and ensuring complete interoperability across the systems.

We're reaching CAF ends also through another way: agile combat support. If you think about a fully integrated network that's out there today with reachback and support, unmanned aerial system operators at Creech Air (inaudible), a distributed common ground system analyst that's there, all the way to an AOC inside of the theater, if you think about force presentation; training, employing, and integrating our forces to meet a Joint combatant commander's requirements, requirements that are often well beyond the traditional Air Force, we should applaud those, and do them across all the warfighting domains, sending our Total Force airmen outside the wire and answering our nation's call, which is "send me", so I would simply posit that this inclusive Combat Air Force's strategic plan as a path.

The gentlemen at the front row would argue that it's a well-developed, it's a thoughtful one, and it's useful in a time of turbulence, turbulence today because of fiscal uncertainty, turbulence because of the aging fleet and systemic problems associated with it, turbulence because of the war on terrorism, and the advances in terms of the rising peer or near-peer, especially from a technological standpoint. But I think the Chief has also been instructive when he says, "You know turbulence can sharpen our skills. Skilled airmen aren't just simply born of clear skies, as we've been trained. Turbulence demands that we focus and it helps frame our expectations as well. So, why is all of this important? Maybe it's a bit of an opportunity as we close to think about or relearn some of the lessons we have from the past, and I had a recent trip to Barksdale Air Force Base talking with the leadership there at the 2nd Bomb Wing in 8th Air Force, and they talked about turbulence in that discussion, and perhaps maybe it's worth reminding us as airmen, young or old, those that are still in service or those that are still serving in partnership with us. You know, orchestrating the dissuasion and deterrence end during the Cold War, the United States was faced with some pretty tough challenges. They were technological and they were physical, and each of those became a risk which had to be assessed, and those risks had to be mitigated as well.

You know early on from the history lesson if we turned back the clock and take a look at that "deterrence competition" with the Soviet Union, in terms of who had the ability to out produce who in terms of bombers and fighters and missiles, we were losing that one. But to mitigate that risk we looked at this from a slightly different approach; we increased our capability, we enhanced our reliability, we demonstrated the accuracy of our weapons, we hardened our facilities, we made our bombers, our fighters, our subs more survivability. So in the face of austerity, we went back to where we had great

advantage and didn't give that up. So the understanding and mitigation of risk we displayed that we had the will and the credibility to carry out a strike even if deterrence had failed. That combination of capability, capacity, and will demonstrated our resolve. It made us credible in the eyes of our adversaries and it assured our allies. These incredible times of turbulence, in my mind, were met head-on by airmen, and we are, all of us in this room, are the descendants of those airmen.

Now, I do realize, as I stand up here on the stage with you today, that sometimes airmen can look through their own set of lenses. That's true for me as the commander of Air Combat Command, and I think it's true for most of us. It's easily illustrated by an ability for me and my brothers and sisters to create a masterful plan, if you will, which focuses on our mission, on our tasks, our goals, our limitations, and it's a pretty easy path to walk if you only have to be in step with yourself. But I think it's important for us to realize that everybody has a set of lenses, or a view, a perspective, that they look through. And we need to recognize that view and understand how our air forces view through those lenses. There's a national view; it's a view through the media. There's a DOD has a view, Joint force commanders have a view, a perspective, and our sister services may have yet another view, and we've got to consider it all. Because, in my mind all, of those views are important and none should be considered, however, subservient; each is going to be incomplete without the other.

Perhaps another view we can take is to wind that clock back with the kids that I sat with in the back of the room yesterday to pre-1947, and ask ourselves questions about our independent Air Force. What was the view of Congress at that time, the time of decision for whether or not the United States Air Force would be an independent service? You know back then we only had four major commands; we had Strategic Air Command, Air Defense Command, we had MATS, and we had Tactical Air Command. The question is: Would we be creating an independent Air Force without the capabilities inherent to SAC and ADC if that question was posed to us today? I think it's unlikely, not the command, not the organization, but the capability, and as important as they are, it's unlikely that we would have been born with a sole purpose of simply providing airlift and air support. We would not have been just an independent Air Force. And while SAC and ADC are long gone, I'd argue that those organizations themselves were not what was most important. What was most important was that we'd continue to provide our nation with the capabilities that they provided, the capability to hold targets at risk while keeping our forces out of harm's way; keeping the people of the United States and our interests free from attack.

Perhaps another way to remind ourselves of the value of the Air Force is in partnership with our sister services; Army Aviation, I don't tug against it because guess what, it's optimized to provide organic mobility, surveillance, and reconnaissance, indirect fire, and close air support to the tactical forces on the battlefield and I would argue in support of Army Aviation; it is of extreme value. The primary role of Naval Aviation—protect the fleet however by removing the littoral regions in the vicinity of military operations and conducting flight operations from the sea, it's provided the nation unique capability for presence around the globe. Again, this is of huge significance. Marine Corps Aviation; I've got some envy here—fully integrated with its infantry forces,

fully integrated with its infantry forces, rather than support its infantry. It operates as a single interdependent ground-centric force that can operate from land or sea; totally integrated; remarkable in terms of capability.

Now let's talk about our US Air Force. It is the service that has historically operated from garrison to project power at long distance in employing effects platforms; strike aircraft, airdrop, surveillance, reconnaissance, air superiority, and it's been enabled by strategic tankers and their capability. The Air Force can support ground or maritime operations but it's unique in its ability to deliver global and theater effects and it's unmatched in terms of span and scope. From our very beginnings in the days of 1947, airmen are improving their effectiveness. If you just do another history lesson, the '50s and '60s, Cold War, almost an exclusive focus on nuclear deterrence, but we morphed and we changed and we embraced; Vietnam, where we changed the way we looked at airpower as a critical enabler for force-on-force conflict. After the post-Cold War drawdown, we confronted Saddam Hussein and we did that with F-15s guarding the skies while our fighters and our bombers conducted 38 days' worth of a campaign to enable ground forces and give them freedom of action to occupy Southern Iraq. 1999—Allied Force enabled a diplomatic instrument of power to be effective.

And today our Chief is correct—we are all in the current fight on terrorism, and it brings with it new challenges of asymmetric warfare. I think we can apply an airman's perspective to suggest alternative approaches to issues other than what our nation is facing. Clearly, I think we can. Airmen must continue to look at problems a bit differently, that's the challenge for us. We have to strike the balance; we have to be imaginative and inventive. The international political environment's changed and it's going to continue to change, we need to get over that. But our view of military national security operations remind us of why the nation needs an independent and interdependent United States Air Force, for many of the same reasons it did when it was established in 1947, to sustain the full spectrum force, which encourages innovation, stimulates science and technology, and strengthens partners around the globe.

So, I been up here for a long time and I'm sure that many of you are going to be sad to see the AFA symposium come to a close, but you may not be as sad to see me leave the stage. But before I leave, I'd simply like to share one more thing for our kids in the back. I'm proud of who we are—airmen. And I'm proud of where we come from—air-mindedness. But I'm also proud of where we're going, and what the path is that's defined. And I think that's where we all come in inside of this room; sister services, partners in industry. I'm looking forward to that partnership and the continuing challenge ahead, and I think with your partnership we'll get this more right. And with that, I'd like to thank you for the honor of being able to address you today with where we were, where we are, where we're going, and maybe a little bit on why it's important. So thank you very much. (Applause.)

Dunn: We've got time for just a couple of questions, and I'll take the prerogative of the Chair to ask the first one, and it's more of a personal one. I first met General Corley when he was flying out of the Philippines and he was known as "Conan the Librarian". I'm not sure where that came from but maybe we heard a little bit of it today, but Sir,

looking back on your career, how would you describe your legacy of what you've seen in the Air Force and what you leave behind?

Corley: Great thought, Mike. One, the first thing is, and I guess I tip my hand at the last AFA in DC, when you ask the question of, where would you invest that next dollar? And I said, "In our airmen," so from a legacy standpoint; I think the core of our combat capability is in our airmen. (Applause). And the legacy that I know our Chief and our Secretary and all of the senior leadership of the Air Force want to leave is a bit of a Bill Creech model. We want to better develop our airmen; officer, enlisted, civilian. That's a legacy that I would like to leave, is an approach to helping better define the leadership and the development of our airmen.

I guess the second thing was kind of in the speech from a legacy standpoint. It was a plan. I want a broad plan, a strategic plan, an inclusive plan, so that we can underpin the Chief's strategy for a viable Air Force now and in the future.

Dunn: I thought your point on dissuading rivals is one that is missed often by those in the press and others in that a future adversary knows that if he's going to mess with America, he's going to mess with the United States Air Force, and why you can't prove whether deterrence necessarily works. The questions I have, there are three on this same subject area, and they're all different. And one says, are we showing off too much capability, and the other one says, are we in danger of losing that capability, and are we capturing the lessons as a result of that capability?

Corley: Let me take a stab at this. On the chart, I presented in's, ways, and means, and I always start from top to bottom. But in this instance, let me begin at the bottom. First, I think you have to have the capability with a capacity, and you have to have credibility. So absent, if you will, a bomber presence, absent a credible, visible, bomber presence; you won't have the means through global attack to be able to underpin the end of 'dissuade and deter'. I have to tell you, when the 509th Bomb Wing prepares to deploy into the Pacific Theater in Guam, one bit of feedback mechanism I know in terms of 'dissuade and deter' is what's out there across the net and who is watching. So, in my mind, capable, credible, capacity to deliver on the ways global attack, with such authority that people find and believe us so as they approach a decision in their life, a strategic crossroad, they'll be dissuaded or deterred, because they'll understand we are capable of and credible of, and possess the will and the capacity to do what we need to do. Does that help at all, Mike?

Dunn: Sir, on behalf of all of us at AFA, I want to thank you for a very thoughtful presentation and your leadership in the United States Air Force.

Corley: Thanks, Mike. (Applause).